Considering that both Lyotard and Nancy (who presumably would also count as "Neo-Nietzschean" for Taylor) are deeply motivated by what they see as the shortcomings of precisely the same epistemological tradition that Taylor criticizes, we might ask to what extent they, too, deal in "transcendental argument". This is definitely the case for Lyotard. Further, the postmodern might ask after the extent of Taylor's residual attachment to the epistemological tradition, despite his criticisms: does Taylor's search for the "correct" model of knowledge, the "correct" transcendental argument, as such overly restrict what might count as a valid transcendental argument?
Or, from the side of the spurned ancient/medieval tradition, we might ask whether transcendental arguments are a new thing. Isn't "asking what must be the case if ..." the very question that led to Plato's "mixed being" and Aristotle's actual/potential distinction. And wasn't the quia argument, which reasons from effects to causes, one of the basic forms of argument for the Scholastics? (And when I say "from effects to causes", I mean from effects to ἀιτίαι: those things which are responsible for something being the way it is.) Isn't the very νοῦς/εἴδος distinction he rejects achieved this way as well?