Meditation II
Translated by DS Thorne
De natura mentis humanae: quod ipsa sit notior quàm corpus
|
On the Nature of the Human Mind: That It Is Better Known than the Body
|
1. In tantas dubitationes hesternâ meditatione conjectus sum, ut nequeam ampliùs earum oblivisci, nec videam tamen quâ ratione solvendae sint; sed, tanquam in profundum gurgitem ex improviso delapsus, ita turbatus sum, ut nec possim in imo pedem figere, nec enatare ad summum. Enitar tamen & tentabo rursus eandem viam quam heri fueram ingressus, removendo scilicet illud omne quod vel minimum dubitationis admittit, nihilo secius quàm si omnino falsum esse comperissem; pergamque porro donec aliquid certi, vel, si nihil aliud, saltem hoc ipsum pro certo, nihil esse certi, cognoscam. Nihil nisi punctum petebat Archimedes, quod esset firmum & immobile, ut integram terram loco dimoveret; magna quoque speranda sunt, si vel minimum quid invenero quod certum sit & inconcussum.
|
I was thrown into such doubts by yesterday’s meditation, that I am no longer able to forget them, nor do I see however by what reason they are to be solved. But rather just as much as I have unexpectedly slipped into a profound whirlpool, I am thus thrown in confusion, that I can neither reach the bottom with my feet, nor swim up to the top. I shall struggle upwards nevertheless and try the same way that I had come in yesterday, by removing all of that which admits the least bit of doubt, by nothing other than if I had discovered altogether false; I shall proceed until I find something certain, or, if nothing else, at least this itself to be certain: that nothing is certain. Archimedes aimed at nothing but a firm and immovable point, in order to displace the entire world; likewise great things are to be hoped for, if I will find something minimal that is certain and unshaken.
|
2. Suppono igitur omnia quae video falsa esse; credo nihil unquam extitisse eorum quae mendax memoria repraesentat; nullos plane habeo sensus; corpus, figura, extensio, motus, locusque sunt chimerae. Quid igitur erit verum? Fortassis hoc unum, nihil esse certi.
|
I therefore suppose all things I see to be false; I believe nothing of them to have existed which a lying memory shows; I have strictly nothing by way of sense; body, figure, extension, motion and location are all chimeras. So what will be true? Perhaps this one thing, that there is nothing certain.
|
3. Sed unde scio nihil esse diversum ab iis omnibus quae jam jam recensui, de quo ne minima quidem occasio sit dubitandi? Nunquid est aliquis Deus, vel quocunque nomine illum vocem, qui mihi has ipsas cogitationes immittit? Quare verò hoc putem, cùm forsan ipsemet illarum author esse possim? Nunquid ergo saltem ego aliquid sum? Sed jam negavi me habere ullos sensus, & ullum corpus. Haereo tamen; nam quid [25] inde? Sumne ita corpori sensibusque alligatus, ut sine illis esse non possim? Sed mihi persuasi nihil plane esse in mundo, nullum coelum, nullam terram, nullas mentes, nulla corpora; nonne igitur etiam me non esse? Imo certe ego eram, si quid mihi persuasi. Sed est deceptor nescio quis, summe potens, summe callidus, qui de industriâ me semper fallit. Haud dubie igitur ego etiam sum, si me fallit; & fallat quantum potest, nunquam tamen efficiet, ut nihil sim quamdiu me aliquid esse cogitabo. Adeo ut, omnibus satis superque pensitatis, denique statuendum sit hoc pronuntiatum, Ego sum, ego existo, quoties a me profertur, vel mente concipitur, necessario esse verum.
|
But whence do I know that there is nothing apart from all this things which I now consider, of which not even on the slightest occasion are to be doubted? Surely God is someone, by whatever name I call him, who puts all these thoughts into me? Why do I think this true, when perhaps I myself am the author of these things? Surely then I at least am something? But now I deny that I have any sense or any body. I hold on, for whither can I? Am I bound by such a body and such senses, that without these I cannot be? But I convinced myself that there is simply nothing in the wold, no heaven, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Is it further then the case that I am not? At bottom I will certainly be, if something convinces me. But there is a deceiver—I don’t now who—full of power and cunning, who always beguiles me from my purpose. It is by no means doubtful that I actually am, if he deceives me; and even if he deceives as much as he can, he will never bring it about, that I am nothing for as long as I will thing that I am something. I approach that, all things having been considered, in the end this pronouncement is to be established: I am, I exist, as often as it is brought forth or taken up in the mind, it is necessarily true.
|
4. Nondum verò satis intelligo, quisnam sim ego ille, qui jam necessario sum; deincepsque cavendum est ne forte quid aliud imprudenter assumam in locum meî, sicque aberrem etiam in eâ cognitione, quam omnium certissimam evidentissimamque esse contendo. Quare jam denuo meditabor quidnam me olim esse crediderim, priusquam in has cogitationes incidissem; ex quo deinde subducam quidquid allatis rationibus vel minimum potuit infirmari, ut ita tandem praecise remaneat illud tantum quod certum est & inconcussum.
|
I do not yet sufficiently understand, who I am, who I now am by necessity. And in turn it is to avoided that I unwisely assume something else to be in my place, in such a way that I would wander astray in that thought, that of all things I assert the the most certain and evident of all. For this reason I once again meditate what I once believed myself to be, before I happened into these thoughts; from which I shall next remove anything by whatever reason I could have been the least weakened, that in the end strictly that would remain that is certain and indubitable.
|
5. Quidnam igitur antehac me esse putavi? Hominem scilicet. Sed quid est homo? Dicamne animal rationale? Non, quia postea quaerendum foret quidnam animal sit, & quid rationale, atque ita ex unâ quaestione in plures difficilioresque delaberer; nec jam mihi tantum otii est, ut illo velim inter istiusmodi subtilitates abuti. Sed hîc potius attendam, quid sponte [26] & naturâ duce cogitationi meae antehac occurrebat, quoties quid essem considerabam. Nempe occurrebat primo, me habere vultum, manus, brachia, totamque hanc membrorum machinam, qualis etiam in cadavere cernitur, & quam corporis nomine designabam. Occurrebat practerea me nutriri, incedere, sentire, & cogitare: quas quidem actiones ad animam referebam. Sed quid esset haec anima, vel non advertebam, vel exiguum nescio quid imaginabar, instar venti, vel ignis, vel aetheris, quod crassioribus meî partibus esset infusum. De corpore verò ne dubitabam quidem, sed distincte me nosse arbitrabar ejus naturam, quam si forte, qualem mente concipiebam, describere tentassem, sic explicuissem: per corpus intelligo illud omne quod aptum est figurâ aliquâ terminari, loco circumscribi, spatium sic replere, ut ex eo aliud omne corpus excludat; tactu, visu, auditu, gustu, vel odoratu percipi, necnon moveri pluribus modis, non quidem a seipso, sed ab alio quopiam a quo tangatur: namque habere vim seipsum movendi, item sentiendi, vel cogitandi, nullo pacto ad naturam corporis pertinere judicabam; quinimo mirabar potius tales facultates in quibusdam corporibus reperiri.
|
What then did I consider myself to be before this? Certainly a man. But what is a man? Would I say “rational animal”? No, because after that it would have to be asked what an animal is, and what “rational” is, and so in this way I would descend from one question into many and more difficult questions; neither do I now enjoy such leisure, that I would wish to squander it on subtleties of that sort. But I had better pay attention to this, which then spontaneously and naturally came into my thoughts whenever I was considering what I was. Of course it first came to mind that I have a face, hands, arms, and the entire machine of members of which sort we also discern in a cadaver, and which I designated with the name of the body. Beyond this it came to mind that I was fed, I walked, felt and thought: which actions I certainly attributed to the soul. But what this soul was, either I did not consider, or I scarcely know what I imagined, the image of wind, or of fire, or of aether, which had been poured into my coarser parts. Indeed I did not truly doubt the of the body, but I judged that I did know its nature distinctly. And if by chance I had wished to describe what sort of thing I conceived I would have explained thus: as “body” I understand all that which is such as to be bound by some figure, circumscribed by place, thus filling space, so that it excludes from it every other body; by touching, seeing, hearing, tasting or smelling they are perceived and also moved in many ways, not indeed by itself, but by another thing by which it is touched: for I did not judge having the force to move itself, and similarly to feel, or think, to pertain to the nature of the body. On the contrary, I was the more amazed to discover such abilities in these bodies.
|
6. Quid autem nunc, ubi suppono deceptorem aliquem potentissimum, &, si fas est dicere, malignum, datâ operâ in omnibus, quantum potuit, me delusisse? Possumne affirmare me habere vel minimum quid ex iis omnibus, quae jam dixi ad naturam corporis pertinere? Attendo, cogito, revolvo, nihil occurrit; fatigor eadem frustrà repetere. Quid verò ex iis quae animae tribuebam? Nutriri vel incedere? Quandoquidem jam corpus non habeo, haec quoque nihil sunt nisi figmenta. Sentire? Nempe etiam hoc non fit sine corpore, & permulta sentire visus sum in somnis quae deinde animadverti me non sensisse. Cogitare? Hîc invenio: cogitatio est; hacc sola a me divelli nequit. Ego sum, ego existo; certum est. Quandiu autem? Nempe quandiu cogito; nam forte etiam fieri posset, si cessarem ab omni cogitatione, ut illico totus esse desinerem. Nihil nunc admitto nisi quod necessario sit verum; sum igitur praecise tantùm res cogitans, id est, mens, sive animus, sive intellectus, sive ratio, voces mihi priùs significationis ignotae. Sum autem res vera, & vere existens; sed qualis res? Dixi, cogitans.
|
What now, that I have supposed some most powerful and, if it is right to say, malign deceptor to have deluded me in all things as much as he could? Can I affirm myself to have at least something of all these things that I said pertained to the nature of the body? I pay close attention, I think, I turn about, but nothing comes to mind; I tire to repeat the same things in vain. Which of these things are true which I attributed to the soul? Nourishment or locomotion? Since I have no body, these things, too, are nothing but fictions. Perceiving? Surely this would not be without the body, and I seemed to perceive many things in sleep that I then notice I did not perceive. Thinking? This I find: thinking is; this alone cannot be taken from me. I am, I exist; that is certain. But for how long? Certainly for as long as I think, for if it is possible to happen, had I ceased from all thoughts, I would have altogether ceased to be on the spot. I now admit nothing except that which is necessarily true; I am therefore precisely such a thinking thing, that is, a mind, or a soul, or an intellect, or reason, which terms I previously did not understand. I am therefore a real thing and a truly exiting thing. But what manner of thing? As I have said, a thinking thing.
|
7. Quid praeterea? Imaginabor: non sum compages illa membrorum, quae corpus humanum appellatur; non sum etiam tenuis aliquis aër istis membris infusus, non ventus, non ignis, non vapor, non halitus, non quidquid mihi fingo: supposui enim ista nihil esse. Manet positio: nihilominus tamen ego aliquid sum. Fortassis verò contingit, ut haec ipsa, quae suppono nihil esse, quia mihi sunt ignota, tamen in rei veritate non differant ab eo me quem novi? Nescio, de hac re jam non disputo; de iis tantùm quae mihi nota sunt, judicium ferre possum. Novi me existere; quaero quis sim ego ille quem novi. Certissimum est hujus sic praecise sumpti notitiam non pendere ab iis quae existere nondum novi; non igitur ab iis ullis, quae ima[gi]natione effingo. Atque hoc verbum, effingo, admonet me erroris mei: nam fingerem reverà, si quid me esse imaginarer, quia nihil aliud est imaginari quàm rei corporeae figuram, seu imaginem, contemplari. Jam autem certò scio me esse, simulque fieri posse ut omnes istae imagines, & generaliter quaecunque ad corporis naturam referuntur, nihil sint praeter insomnia. Quibus animadversis, non minus ineptire videor, dicendo: imaginabor, ut distinctius agnoscam quisnam sim, quàm si dicerem: jam quidem sum experrectus, videoque nonnihil veri, sed quia nondum video satis evidenter, datâ operâ obdormiam, ut hoc ipsum mihi somnia verius evidentiusque repraesentent. Itaque cognosco nihil eorum quae possum imaginationis ope comprehendere, ad hanc quam de me habeo notitiam pertinere, mentemque ab illis diligentissime esse avocandam, ut suam ipsa naturam quàm distinctissime percipiat.
|
What is there besides this? I picture: I am not the aggregate of those members that are called the human body; and I am not a delicate air infused into those members, not wind, not fire, not vapor, not breath, not something I fashion for myself; for I have supposed these things to be nothing. The position remains: nevertheless I am something. Perhaps it holds true that these things that I suppose to be nothing, because they are unknown to me, nevertheless in reality do not differ from those things that I know? I do not know, I do not dispute this matter now; I am able to pass judgment on things which are known to me. I know that I exist; I seek who is this “I” whom I know.[?] It is most certain that acquaintance with those things, strictly speaking, do not depend on those things that I still do not know; and therefore not on any of those that I form with my imagination. Moreover this word, I imagine, warns me of my error: for I have in fact formed an image, if I have imagined myself to be something, because to imagine is nothing besides contemplating the figure or likeness of corporeal things. Now I know with certainty that I am, and the same time it possibly is the case that all of these likenesses, and in general all that refers to the nature of the body, are nothing but daydreams. By these observations I am seen to be no less inept when I say: I will use my imagination so that I know myself more distinctly, as when I would say: now I am certainly awake, and I see a number of real things, but because I do not yet see clearly enough, I shall intentionally fall asleep, so that this itself will be more truly and clearly represented in my dream. And so I know that nothing of those things which I can comprehend with the aid of the imagination, pertain to the knowledge which I have of myself, and that the mind is to be summoned away from these things, so that I may perceive its own nature as distinctly as possible.
|
8. Sed quid igitur sum? Res cogitans. Quid est hoc? Nempe dubitans, intelligens, affirmans, negans, volens, nolens, imaginans quoque, & sentiens.
|
But what am I? A thinking thing. What is that? Truly a deliberating, understanding, asserting, denying, willing, refusing, imagining and also perceiving thing.
|
9. Non pauca sanè haec sunt, si cuncta ad me pertineant. Sed quidni pertinerent? Nonne ego ipse sum qui jam dubito ferè de omnibus, qui nonnihil tamen intelligo, qui hoc unum verum esse affirmo, nego caetera, cupio plura nosse, nolo decipi, multa vel invitus imaginor, multa etiam tanquam a sensibus venientia animadverto? Quid est horum, quamvis semper dor [29] miam, quamvis etiam is qui me creavit, quantum in se est, me deludat, quod non aeque verum sit ac me esse? Quid est quod a meâ cogitatione distinguatur? Quid est quod a me ipso separatum dici possit? Nam quod ego sim qui dubitem, qui intelligam, qui velim, tam manifestum est, ut nihil occurrat per quod evidentius explicetur. Sed verò etiam ego idem sum qui imaginor; nam quamvis fortè, ut supposui, nulla prorsus res imaginata vera sit, vis tamen ipsa imaginandi revera existit, & cogitationis meae partem facit. Idem denique ego sum qui sentio, sive qui res corporeas tanquam per sensus animadverto: videlicet jam lucem video, strepitum audio, calorem sentio. Falsa haec sunt, dormio enim. At certe videre videor, audire, calescere. Hoc falsum esse non potest; hoc est proprie quod in me sentire appellatur; atque hoc praecise sic sumptum nihil aliud est quàm cogitare.
|
These matters are not trifling [pauca sana], if they pertain to me. But why would they not pertain to me? Am I myself not he who now wildly doubts all matters, who nevertheless knows something, who asserts this to be a true thing, denies the rest, desires to know more, refuses to be deceived, imagines many things against his will and also notices many things coming in by the senses? What is it of these things, even if I were always asleep, and even if he who created me, to the extent he exists, is deluding me,[…]? Which would be distinguished from my thought? Which could be said to be separate from myself? For that I am he who would deliberate, understand, desire, is so manifest that nothing could come to mind by which it could be explained more clearly. And yet I am truly the same as he who imagines, for even though by chance, just to suppose, nothing imagined to be true absolutely is, nevertheless this force of imagination itself exists, and make up a part of my thought. And further I am the same as he who perceives, or he who notices corporeal things as if through the senses: it is evident that I now see light, hear sound and feel heat. These are false because I sleep. But on the other hand I certainly appear to be seeing, hearing and growing warm. This cannot be false; this is that in me which is properly called perceiving; and this presumed to be such is precisely nothing other than thinking.
|
10. Ex quibus equidem aliquanto melius incipio nosse quisnam sim; sed adhuc tamen videtur, nec possum abstinere quin putem, res corporeas, quarum imagines cogitatione formantur, & quas ipsi sensus explorant, multo distinctius agnosci quàm istud nescio quid meî, quod sub imaginationem non venit: quanquam profecto sit mirum, res quas animadverto esse dubias, ignotas, a me alienas, distinctius quàm quod verum est, quod cognitum, quàm denique me ipsum, a me comprehendi. Sed video quid sit: gaudet aberrare mens mea, necdum se patitur intra veritatis limites cohiberi. Esto igitur, & adhuc semel laxissimas habe [30] nas ei permittamus, ut, illis paulo post opportune reductis, facilius se regi patiatur.
|
From this things I truly begin to know better who I am. However it is seen, that I am still unable to hold back from thinking that I know corporeal things, whose images are formed in thought, and which the senses themselves explore, much more distinctly than that I-know-not-what of mine, which does not enter into the imagination: it would be remarkable that the thing that I realize is doubtful, unknown, foreign to me, is more distinct than that which is true and known, than even myself as comprehended by me. But I see what the matter is: my mind delights in error, and it does not yet suffer to be restrained within the limits of truth. Let it be, then, let us still grant it very free feign, so that, when it has been led back after a small while, it will suffer to be ruled more easily.
|
11. Consideremus res illas quae vulgo putantur omnium distinctissime comprehendi: corpora scilicet, quae tangimus, quae videmus; non quidem corpora in communi, generales enim istae perceptiones aliquantò magis confusae esse solent, sed unum in particulari. Sumamus, exempli causâ, hanc ceram: nuperrime ex favis fuit educta; nondum amisit omnem saporem sui mellis; nonnihil retinet odoris florum ex quibus collecta est; ejus color, figura, magnitudo, manifesta sunt; dura est, frigida est, facile tangitur, ac, si articulo ferias, emittet sonum; omnia denique illi adsunt quae requiri videntur, ut corpus aliquod possit quàm distinctissime cognosci. Sed ecce, dum loquor, igni admovetur: saporis reliquiae purgantur, odor expirat, color mutatur, figura tollitur, crescit magnitudo, fit liquida, fit calida, vix tangi potest, nec jam, si pulses, emittet sonum. Remanetne adhuc eadem cera? Remanere fatendum est; nemo negat, nemo aliter putat. Quid erat igitur in eâ quod tam distincte comprehendebatur? Certe nihil eorum quae sensibus attingebam; nam quaecunque sub gustum, vel odoratum, vel visum, vel tactum, vel auditum veniebant, mutata jam sunt: remanet cera.
|
Let us consider those things that are commonly supposed to be understood most distinctly: bodies, of course, that we touch and see; not indeed bodies in general, for those general perceptions are usually more confused, but rather one particular one. Let us suppose, for the sake of example, this wax recently taken from the honeycomb. It no longer sends forth the savor of its honey, yet it retains to a degree the odor of the flower from which it was collected. Is color, form and size are plain to see. It is hard, cool, easy to the touch and, if you hit it with your knuckle, it emits a sound. And so everything pertaining to it is present which is necessary for it to be seen, so that some body may be examined with greatest distinctness. But, behold, as I speak I move toward the fire: it becomes cleansed of its remaining savor, its odor dissipates, its color changes, the form is destroyed, it grows in size, becomes liquid, becomes hot, it can hardly be touched, nor does it emit a sound if you knock on it. Does the same wax remain? It must be admitted that it remains; no one denies it or thinks differently. What therefore was in it which was so distinctly comprehended? Certainly nothing of it that touched the senses, for whatever came under taste or odor or sight or touch or sound now is changed, yet the wax remains.
|
12. Fortassis illud erat quod nunc cogito: nempe ceram ipsam non quidem fuisse istam dulcedinem mellis, nec florum fragrantiam, nec istam albedinem, nec figuram, nec sonum, sed corpus quod mihi apparebat paulo ante modis istis conspicuum, nunc diversis. Quid est autem hoc praecise quod sic imaginor? Attenda [31] mus, &, remotis iis quae ad ceram non pertinent, videamus quid supersit: nempe nihil aliud quàm extensum quid, flexibile, mutabile. Quid verò est hoc flexibile, mutabile? An quod imaginor, hanc ceram ex figurâ rotundâ in quadratam, vel ex hac in triangularem verti posse? Nullo modo; nam innumerabilium ejusmodi mutationum capacem eam esse comprehendo, nec possum tamen innumerabiles imaginando percurrere; nec igitur comprehensio hacc ab imaginandi facultate perficitur. Quid extensum? Nunquid etiam ipsa ejus extensio est ignota? Nam in cerâ liquescente fit major, major in ferventi, majorque rursus, si calor augeatur; nec recte judicarem quid sit cera, nisi putarem hanc etiam plures secundùm extensionem varietates admittere, quàm fuerim unquam imaginando complexus. Superest igitur ut concedam, me nequidem imaginari quid sit haec cera, sed solâ mente percipere; dico hanc in particulari, de cerâ enim in communi clarius est. Quaenam verò est haec cera, quae non nisi mente percipitur? Nempe eadem quam video, quam tango, quam imaginor, eadem denique quam ab initio esse arbitrabar. Atqui, quod notandum est, ejus perceptio non visio, non tactio, non imaginatio est, nec unquam fuit, quamvis prius ita videretur, sed solius mentis inspectio, quae vel imperfecta esse potest & confusa, ut prius erat, vel clara & distincta, ut nunc est, prout minus vel magis ad illa ex quibus constat attendo.
|
Perhaps it was that which I now consider: clearly that wax was not the very sweetness of honey, nor the fragrance of flowers, nor the whiteness, nor shape, nor sound; but rather it was the body which appeared visible to me in one form just before and now in another. What exactly is this which I thus imagine? Let us attend and, apart from those thing that do not pertain to the wax, see what remains: clearly it is nothing but an extended, flexible, mutable thing. What indeed is this flexible and mutable thing? Do I imagine that this wax can be changed from a round to a square shape, or to a triangular shape? By no means, for I understand it to be capable of innumerable mutations of that sort, nor could I enumerate those innumerable mutations in my imagination; nor therefore could the understanding be brought to completion by the faculty of imagination. What is extension? Can it be that extension itself is unknown? For extension is greater in liquid wax, greater in boiling wax, and greater if heat is increased; and would I judge rightly what wax is unless I thought that it admits more kinds according to extension than I would ever grasp in my imagination. It remains for me to concede that I cannot be imagined as this wax is, but perceived with the mind alone. I speak of this wax in particular but it is clearer in the case of the wax in general. Why is it true of this wax [in particular], that it cannot be perceived but by the mind? Truly it is the same thing that I see, I touch, I imagine, indeed the same which I from the outset judged it to be. And yet, which must be observed, it is not by sight, touch or imagination that it is perceived, nor would it ever be, however often it may have been regarded, but it is by minds alone that it is inspected — an inspection that can be imperfect and confused as it was at first, or clear and distinct as it now is while I attend to those things of which it consists.
|
13. Miror verò interim quàm prona sit mea mens in errores; nam quamvis haec apud me tacitus & sine [32] voce considerem, haereo tamen in verbis ipsis, & fere decipior ab ipso usu loquendi. Dicimus enim nos videre ceram ipsammet, si adsit, non ex colore vel figurâ eam adesse judicare. Unde concluderem statim: ceram ergo visione oculi, non solius mentis inspectione, cognosci; nisi jam forte respexissem ex fenestrâ homines in plateâ transeuntes, quos etiam ipsos non minus usitate quàm ceram dico me videre. Quid autem video praeter pileos & vestes, sub quibus latere possent automata? Sed judico homines esse. Atque ita id quod putabam me videre oculis, solâ judicandi facultate, quae in mente meâ est, comprehendo.
|
At the same time I marvel at how prone my mind is to error; for no matter how I hold this before me silently and without voice, I hesitate at these words and am almost deceived by this manner of talking. For we say that we see the wax itself, if it be there, and not that we judge it to be there from its color or figure. Whence I would conclude right away: the wax is therefore known by the vision of the eye and not by mental inspection alone; were it not that I were now by chance to look out the window upon the people walking along the street, who themselves are no less common than the wax I say that I see. What do I see, aside from hats and garments, beneath which machines might lie hidden? And yet I juge them to be men. And so that which I think I see with the eyes I comprehend by the faculty of judgment alone, which is in the mind.
|
14. Sed pudeat supra vulgus sapere cupientem, ex formis loquendi quas vulgus invenit dubitationem quaesivisse; pergamusque deinceps, attendendo utrùm ego perfectius evidentiusque percipiebam quid esset cera, cùm primùm aspexi, credidique me illam ipso sensu externo, vel saltem sensu communi, ut vocant, id est potentiâ imaginatrice, cognoscere? an verò potiùs nunc, postquam diligentiùs investigavi tum quid ea sit, tum quomodo cognoscatur? Certe hac de re dubitare esset ineptum; nam quid fuit in primâ perceptione distinctum? Quid quod non a quovis animali haberi posse videretur? At verò cùm ceram ab externis formis distinguo, & tanquam vestibus detractis nudam considero, sic illam revera, quamvis adhuc error in judicio meo esse possit, non possum tamen sine humanâ mente percipere.
|
And yet I would be ashamed to desire to know beyond the common man, if I were to seek doubt from the common man’s manner of speaking. Let us proceed then by attending whether I perceived more perfectly and clearly what wax is when I first beheld it and believed I comprehended it by the external senses themselves, or whether at least by common sense, that is to say, by the power of imagination. Or is it more truly more the case now, after I have more diligently investigated what it is, that it is in this way understood? To doubt this is certainly foolish, for what was distinct in the first perception? What was there that manifestly could not be had by any animal? On the other hand when I truly distinguish the wax from its external forms and consider it, as it were, unclad, as truly itself, whatever error there may still be might in my judgment I am not able to perceive without a human mind.
|
15. Quid autem dicam de hac ipsâ mente, sive de me ipso? Nihildum enim aliud admitto in me esse praeter mentem. Quid, inquam, ego qui hanc ceram videor tam distincte percipere? Nunquid me ipsum non tantùm multo verius, multo certius, sed etiam multo distinctius evidentiusque, cognosco? Nam, si judico ceram existere, ex eo quod hanc videam, certe multo evidentius efficitur me ipsum etiam existere, ex eo ipso quod hanc videam. Fieri enim potest ut hoc quod video non vere sit cera; fieri potest ut ne quidem oculos habeam, quibus quidquam videatur; sed fieri plane non potest, cùm videam, sive (quod jam non distinguo) cùm cogitem me videre, ut ego ipse cogitans non aliquid sim. Simili ratione, si judico ceram esse, ex eo quod hanc tangam, idem rursus efficietur, videlicet me esse. Si ex eo quod imaginer, vel quâvis aliâ ex causâ, idem plane. Sed & hoc ipsum quod de cerâ animadverto, ad reliqua omnia, quae sunt extra me posita, licet applicare. Porro autem, si magis distincta visa sit cerae perceptio, postquam mihi, non ex solo visu vel tactu, sed pluribus ex causis innotuit, quanto distinctiùs me ipsum a me nunc cognosci fatendum est, quandoquidem nullae rationes vel ad cerae, vel ad cu juspiam alterius corporis perceptionem possint juvare, quin eaedem omnes mentis meae naturam melius probent! Sed & alia insuper tam multa sunt in ipsâ mente, ex quibus ejus notitia distinctior reddi potest, ut ea, quae ex corpore ad illam emanant, vix numeranda videantur.
|
What should I say of this mind itself, or of myself? I admit nothing yet to be in myself beyond the mind. What, I say, do I, who sees this wax, perceive so distinctly? Is it possible that I understand myself, not only more truly and certainly, but also more clearly and distinctly? For If I judge wax to exist from that which I see, then it becomes certain that I myself exist all the more clearly from that which I see it. It can happen that that which I see is not truly wax; indeed it can happen that I do not have eyes with which to see anything; but it is plainly not possible that I should see, or (as I now distinguish it) I should think that I see, without I myself, in the act of thinking, being something. By the same reason, if I judge that the wax exists from that by which I touch it, the same thing results, clearly that I exist. If from that which I imagine, or from whatever other cause, the same thing is plain. In truth, I may apply the same thing I observe of this wax, to everything that remains outside of myself. Again, if the perception of the wax appeared more distinct to me after it became known not just by sight or touch, but by many causes, how much more distinctly can I myself be disclosed to myself by the understanding, seeing that no reasons could help the perception of wax or any other body, in fact, that all those things better demonstrate the nature of my mind! But also in addition there are so many other things in this mind from which knowledge of this mind can be more distinctly rendered, that those things that come to the mind from the body should scarcely be considered.
|
16. Atque ecce tandem sponte sum reversus eò quò [34] volebam; nam cùm mihi nunc notum sit ipsamet corpora, non proprie a sensibus, vel ab imaginandi facultate, sed a solo intellectu percipi, nec ex eo percipi quòd tangantur aut videantur, sed tantùm ex eo quod intelligantur aperte cognosco nihil facilius aut evidentius meâ mente posse a me percipi. Sed quia tam cito deponi veteris opinionis consuetudo non potest, placet hîc consistere, ut altius haec nova cognitio memoriae meae diuturnitate meditationis infigatur.
|
And so at last I have been returned back to that which I wished; for now that I know that those same bodies are perceived, not on account of the senses, nor by the faculty of imagination, but are perceived by the intellect alone--nor is that perceived by that which could be touched or seen, but only as much of it open to be understood--I know that nothing can be more easily or clearly known more easily or clearly perceived than by own mind. But because the habit of long opinion cannot be put down so quickly, it is right to pause here in order to, by prolonged meditation, more deeply drive into my memory this new knowledge.
|